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Fewer and Better Children: Race, Class,
Religion, and Birth Control Reform in America1
Melissa J. Wilde and Sabrina Danielsen
University of Pennsylvania
In the early 20th century, contraceptives were illegal and, for many,
especially religious groups, taboo. But, in the span of just two years,
between 1929 and 1931, many of the United States’ most prominent
religious groups pronounced contraceptives to be moral and began
advocating for the laws restricting them to be repealed. Met with ev-
erything from support, to silence, to outright condemnation by other
religious groups, these pronouncements and the debates they caused
divided the American religious ﬁeld by an issue of sex and gender for
theﬁrst time.This article explainswhyAmerica’s religious groups took
the positions they did at this crucial moment in history. In doing so, it
demonstrates that the politics of sex and gender that divide Ameri-
can religion today is deeply rooted in century-old inequalities of race
and class.
In just two years between 1929 and 1931, many of America’s most promi-
nent religious groups suddenly and deﬁnitively called for the laws restricting
contraceptives to be rescinded. Other religious groups reacted swiftly, and of-
ten passionately, to these statements. Still others ignored them altogether.
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We will show that the stances religious groups took at this time can be
explained by their position within the United States’ system of racial and
class stratiﬁcation. We argue that religious organizations’ advocacy for
birth control was a critical component of a “racial project” ðOmi and Win-
ant 1986Þ to curtail the fertility of ðmainly Catholic, but also JewishÞ im-
migrants.
In the early 1920s the United States restricted immigration and stopped a
seemingly endless tide of southern and eastern European immigrants. But
by this time,millions of such immigrants already crowdedAmerica’s largest
cities. These immigrants were widely viliﬁed as threats to the nation’s po-
litical and economic institutions. In accordance with the increasingly in-
ﬂuential pseudoscientiﬁc theories of heredity of the day, they were seen by
many as a genetic threat to the very existence of the “American” population.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that by the late 1920s, about half of Amer-
ica’s most prominent religious groups believed that race suicidewas occur-
ring—that white Anglo-Saxon Protestants were being outbred by southern
and eastern European immigrants. However, believing in race suicide was
not enough to cause religious organizations to ofﬁcially advocate for birth
control. To do so, a religious group also needed to believe in the social
gospel, a theology that saw improving society as a fundamental duty of
good Christians. Like concerns about race suicide, belief in the social
gospel movement was pervasive among about half of all major denomi-
nations.
Nine of the most prominent religious groups in the country believed
in both race suicide and the social gospel. These groups became the reli-
gious center of the racial project around birth control—the primary or-
ganizational vehicles to legitimate it and organize mass support, and ul-
timately the only groups that made public pronouncements in favor of
liberalization at this time.
As ﬁgure 1 illustrates, the ways in which beliefs about race suicide and
the social gospel intersected explain the stances of other religious groups
as well. Those who believed in race suicide but not the social gospel became
“unofﬁcial supporters” and did not make ofﬁcial statements about birth
control for another 30 years. Groups that believed in neither race sui-
cide nor the social gospel saw no justiﬁcation for the sudden wave of birth
control liberalizations and became “critics” of reform. Groups that believed
in the social gospel movement but not race suicide remained silent out of
respect for their fellow religious activists whose racial views they rejected.
RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND RELIGION
American religion today is deeply divided between “progressives” and “con-
servatives,” terms that have become synonymous with opposing views of
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a few key issues that relate to sex and gender—namely abortion, femi-
nism, andhomosexuality ðDavis andRobinson 1996;DiMaggio,Evans, and
Bryson 1996; Hoffmann and Miller 1997; McConkey 2001; Brooks 2002;
Edgell 2006; Cadge, Olson, and Wildeman 2008Þ. While most sociological
studies of American religion and politics take these differences as a given
or examine their correlates, we examine the roots of these differences—the
ﬁrst issue relevant to sex and gender, which galvanized the American re-
ligious ﬁeld.2
FIG. 1.—Stances on birth control by belief in race suicide and the social gospel
2We deﬁne religious ﬁeld as the “organizational ﬁeld” in American religious denomi-
nations competed “not just for resources and customers, but for political power and
institutional legitimacy” ðDiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 150Þ. There is one study of the
ﬁeld as a whole that deserves mention: Robert Wuthnow’s extremely inﬂuential The
Restructuring of American Religion ð1988Þ, which highlights increasing and unequal
access to higher education as the key factor behind divergent views within American
religion. In Restructuring, Wuthnow examines factors, largely post–World War II, that
have to do with class, mainly access to higher education, which explain increasing
attitudinal variation within denominations ðWuthnow 1988, p. 154Þ. Although we, too,
are interested in the ways in which inequality has affected American religion ðsomething
that used to be a core part of the sociology of religion—e.g., Niebuhr ½1929, Demerath
½1965, Vidich and Bensman ½1958, Weber ½ð1905Þ 2001— but has largely been ignored
for the past ﬁve decades, with the notable exceptions of Park and Reimer ½2002, Keister
½2003, and Smith and Farris ½2005Þ, our study differs fromWuthnow’s in that we focus
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Despite the fact that nothing created more controversy than denomi-
nations’ stances on contraception circa 1930, little is known about the re-
ligious supporters or opponents of birth control outside of the infamous
resistance of the Roman Catholic Church.3 Most studies of the birth con-
trol or eugenics movement ðthe key nonreligious promoter of race suicide
concernsÞ say nothing about religion.4 Likewise, most studies of Ameri-
can religion, including those that study the social gospel movement, say
nothing about the wave of birth control advocacy that took place among
American religious groups in the early 1930s, much less about other reli-
gious groups’ reactions to that advocacy.5
These are major oversights. We found that denominations that were
then, and remain today, America’s staunchest religious “progressives”
were deeply involved in birth control reform and that these efforts were
profoundly intertwinedwith a process of racialization.6 Unfortunately, there
has been little acknowledgment or examination of religion’s often central
role in racialization processes.7
on earlier differences between denominations to explain the ﬁrst issue of sex and gender
that really divided it.
3Although predating birth control as issues, neither women’s ordination nor woman
suffrage was as divisive. Chaves ð1997Þ demonstrates that women’s ordination was not
divisive, and Wilde ð2013Þ found that while many denominations supported woman suf-
frage a position vis-à-vis the issue was not seen as necessary for nor deﬁning of one’s
identity within the American religious ﬁeld.
4This is true for studies focused on birth control ðKennedy 1970; Reed 1978; Gordon
1990; Franks 2005Þ or eugenics ðHaller 1963; Pickens 1969; Ludmerer 1972; Rafter 1988,
1992, 1997; King and Ruggles 1990; Reilly 1991; Keyles 1995; Larson 1995; Kline 2001;
Ramsden 2003; Black 2004; Stern 2005; Bruinius 2006Þ. Rosen’s ð2004Þ Preaching Eu-
genics does examine the relationship between religious groups and the eugenics move-
ment but portrays only progressive religious groups as eugenicists ðan inaccuracy we
correct with our more systematic sampleÞ. Leon ð2004Þ focuses on a few Catholic outli-
ers who were critically engaged with the movement. Neither provides any discussion
of birth control reform.
5Studies of the social gospel movement ðLatta 1936; Carter 1956; White 1990; Luker
1991; Marty 1992; Phillips 1996; Smith 2000Þ and American religious history more
generally tend to ignore this wave of birth control reform ðSzasz 1982; Ahlstrom 2004;
Marsden 2006Þ. Even Martin Marty, who acknowledges the Anglo-Saxon focus of
American Protestantism at this time and quotes a contemporary observer noting that
American Protestants were crusading for the “Americanization of immigrants, and even
the gospel of eugenics and birth control” ðMarty 1986 p. 215–16; see also p. 63Þ does not
investigate these connections further. The sole exception is Tobin ð2001Þ. While her
argument is consistent with ours, her book focuses on the early liberalizers and the
critics, and largely misses the groups that avoided making public pronouncements.
6For information on how early stances on birth control relate to contemporary divisions
with the American religious ﬁeld, see Wilde ð2013Þ.
7Waters ð1990Þ and Emerson and Smith ð2000Þ are major exceptions. This is true despite
the fact that early sociologists of religion saw it as “a very important factor in the preserva-
tion of racial character” ðNiebuhr 1929, p. 110Þ and a key source of social identity ðHerberg
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Theories of racialization examine how “race,” “a concept which signiﬁes
and symbolizes social conﬂicts and interests by referring to different types
of human bodies,” and racial categories are “created, inhabited, trans-
formed and destroyed” ðOmi and Winant 1986, pp. 55–56Þ. A racial proj-
ect is “simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of
racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources
along particular racial lines. Racial projects connect what race means in a
particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures
and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning”
ðp. 56Þ.
Religion was a central part of the racial project of birth control re-
form. This is true in terms of whose fertility was to be controlled, as well
as explaining who was attempting to do the controlling. The targets of
the project were largely Irish and Italian Catholic ðAlba 1985; Erie 1988;
Jacobson 1998; Gugliemo and Salerno 2003; Roediger 2006; Ignatiev 2009Þ
and Jewish immigrants ðBrodkin 1998Þ. These groups numerically and po-
litically threatened the Protestant establishment ðBaltzell 1964Þ—the upper-
andmiddle-class “gatekeepers”whowereAmerica’s ruling class ðEvans 2002;
Beisel andKay 2004; Pyle andDavidson, in pressÞ.8Eugenicists zeroed in on
the establishment’s religious leaders, using them to further their eugenics
education campaigns among the masses and legitimize their legislative
wrangling among elites.
It is important to emphasize here that religion was not just correlated
with a “desirable” or “undesirable” status. It was an essential piece of that
status. Religion was a critical dimension on which race was “culturally
ﬁgured and represented, the manner in which race ½came to be meaningful
as a descriptor of group or individual identity, social issues, and experience”
8Of course, other nonwhite groups were also the focus of eugenicist policies, particularly
regarding immigration restriction ði.e., the Japanese and Chinese Exclusion Acts; Chang
2010Þ, intermarriage between blacks andwhites, and the involuntary sterilization of many
African Americans ðZuberi 2001Þ. However, because of their geographic distribution,
these other nonwhite groups were not generally of concern to the early liberalizers, some-
thing we examine in much greater detail below.
1955Þ. Likewise, there has been almost no investigation of the signiﬁcant class differences
that remain among American religious groups ðnotable exceptions being Pyle and David-
son ½2003 and Smith and Faris ½2005Þ, even though class differenceswere so germane that
many early sociologists took them as a given or considered them an essential part of
stratiﬁcation in the United States ðe.g., Baltzell 1964; Demerath 1965Þ. Sociologists of
religion have continued to emphasize the importance of religion for immigrants ðWarner
and Wittner 1998; Yang and Ebaugh 2001; Chen 2002; Kurien 2004; Cadge 2005; Cadge
and Ecklund 2007;Mooney 2009Þ and African Americans ðPatillo-McCoy 1998; Patterson
1998; Emerson and Smith 2000; Wood 2002; McRoberts 2003; Marti 2009Þ, but this is not
the same thing as racialization processes.
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ðWinant 1998, p. 756Þ. In sum, one cannot understand birth control reform
within the American religious ﬁeld without understanding how race was
seen at the time. And one cannot understand the racial categories at the time
ðparticularly in the NortheastÞ without understanding how they were in-
ﬂuenced by religion. The story of birth control reform in general and within
the American religious ﬁeld in particular provides a powerful example of
the enduring importance of how race, class, and religion intersect in the
United States and the implications of that for views of gender ðCollins 1990;
McCall 2001, 2005Þ.
DATA AND METHODS
This study includes 28 of America’s largest and most prominent religious
denominations. Together they represent 90% of the 55 million Americans
who claimed to be a member of a religious denomination in 1926 ðthe year
closest to the liberalizations that had a Census of Religious Bodies; see
table 1Þ.9
The primary data presented here come from an analysis of each denom-
ination’s periodicalðsÞ between 1919 and 1934.10 Although there was some
9The majority of these denominations ðalmost two-thirds, 17Þ were included because they
had more than 400,000 members in 1926. Only one denomination that met this initial
threshold, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, has been left out. We were unable to
locate any copies of its periodical the Christian Recorder for our time period. Another
11 denominations were included to ensure that the factors we identiﬁed among this sam-
ple of larger denominationswere generalizable to smaller denominations.Weﬁrst included
any smaller denomination that made an early pronouncement in support of birth control
ðthere were four of these: the American Unitarian Association, Reform Jews, the Society
of Friends, and the Universalist ChurchÞ or merged with an early liberalizer during the
period of analysis ðthere was only one of these, the Christian Church, which merged with
the larger Congregationalist Church in 1930Þ. To make sure that the addition of these
smaller denominations did not bias the sample and to allow us to control on theological
leanings and denominational history, we also added denominations by a few other cri-
teria. We included any major precursor denomination that was not an early liberalizer
but would later merge with one ðthere were three of these: Evangelical Synod of North
America, Reformed Church in the United States, and United Presbyterian Church of
North AmericaÞ. We also included any denomination that would otherwise provide an
important comparison group for an early liberalizer ðas Conservative and Orthodox Jews
did for Reform JewsÞ. Finally, we looked for denominations that were in the American
Eugenics Society archives (American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia), and thus pos-
sibly eugenicists, but not early liberalizers ðthere was only one that ﬁt this category: the Re-
formed Church in America, which turned out not to be a strong supporter of eugenicsÞ.
10We do not assume that every member who was reading these periodicals agreed with
the views expressed in them ðor, indeed, with the ofﬁcial stances of their denominationÞ.
Instead, we treat these periodicals and the articles we obtained as representative of the
general beliefs and opinions of the denomination, the level of analysis that is our focus.
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unavoidable variation in the periodicals, in general, they were remarkably
comparable. Two-thirds of the periodicals were weeklies, and all but two
of the periodicals were popularly oriented and written for a general, lay
audience.11
With the rare exception of those that were electronically searchable, the
authors or our assistants examined each of the periodicals by hand and
gathered all articles that mentioned birth control, eugenics, birthrates, race,
racial stock, race suicide, immigration, Catholics, the Federal Council of
Churches, the social gospel, science, evolution, fundamentalists or modern-
ists, woman suffrage, and temperance. On average, we summarized, coded,
and analyzed about 120 articles for 35 periodicals, for a total of about 4,000
articles.12
All denominations’ stances on birth control were coded during the
peak years of discussion ð1929–31Þ. Those coded as “early liberalizers” had
an ofﬁcial statement in support of birth control promulgated by an im-
portant committee or the ofﬁcial denominational leadership ðall also pro-
moted legalization in their periodicalsÞ during this time. “Unofﬁcial sup-
porters” did not make an ofﬁcial statement in favor of legalization for at
least another 20 years but usually published at least one supportive arti-
cle per year. Groups coded as “critics” either ofﬁcially condemned contra-
ception or published numerous articles criticizing it, and often the early lib-
eralizers, during the peak years. Denominations coded as “silent” on birth
control said nothing on the subject between 1929 and 1932.
The codes for all our other measures capture both the frequency and
fervor with which issues were mentioned in the denominations’ period-
icals. In general, “strong supporters” of eugenics, race suicide, or the social
gospel published one to two supportive articles per year during the peak
years of discussion ð1929–32Þ. Groups opposed to eugenics, race suicide,
or the social gospel published very few articles on these subjects ðwith the
exception of the Roman Catholic Church, whose opposition to eugenics
and race suicide was vehemently and frequently expressedÞ, on average
11We gave extra weight to statements from the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church
and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, because their periodicals were published
quarterly. The groups coded as silent did not have periodicals that were more likely to
simply be silent on all issues or that were published less often and thus presented fewer
opportunities to register opinions.
12When it was difﬁcult to determine exactly which periodical was the “primary” peri-
odical for a denomination, we analyzed any major periodical, for a total of 31 periodi-
cals for 28 denominations. We also analyzed the primary periodicals for the American
Eugenics Society ðEugenics: A Journal of Race BettermentÞ, the Federal Council of
Churches ðFederal Council BulletinÞ, the American Birth Control League ðBirth Con-
trol Review: To Create a Race of ThoroughbredsÞ, as well as the mainline Protestant
periodical Christian Century.
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publishing one article roughly every ﬁve years, but those they did were
very strong in their criticism.
To get a clear picture of the way in which immigration was related to
views of race and thus birth control, we created maps of the geographic
concentration of all our denominations.13 Data on the number of mem-
bers of each religious denomination were gathered from the Census of
Religious Bodies ð1926Þ, from which we also obtained measures of class
and other demographic information.14
THE AMERICAN EUGENICS SOCIETY, BIRTH CONTROL,
AND THE RACIALIZATION OF RELIGION
The movement to legalize contraceptives was spearheaded by feminist activ-
ist Margaret Sanger and her American Birth Control League ðABCLÞ. It
is well known that the ABCL was intimately involved with the eugenics
movement, the pseudoscientiﬁc movement for racial “improvement” ðGor-
don 1990; Franks 2005Þ. After all, the subtitle of the Birth Control Review
was To Create a Race of Thoroughbreds. It is less known that Sanger was
not overly welcoming to religious groups, but we found no standing com-
mittees dedicated to mobilizing religious leaders, few relevant articles in
Birth Control Review, and no other evidence of interest in or attempts to
communicate with them.15 In fact, we could ﬁnd no archival evidence of
discernible connections between the ABCL and nearly half of the early lib-
eralizers ðsee table 2Þ.16 Most of America’s religious supporters appear to
13All maps were made with ArcGIS 10. County borders were determined by the County
Shape File from the National Historical Geographic Information System ð1930Þ. When
discrepancies between the 1926 and 1930 borders arose, we used the 1930 borders. Data
are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census ð1926Þ.
14Unfortunately, we could ﬁnd only one concrete measure of class from our time period:
ministers’ mean salaries from the 1916 census and no data on the proportion of each
religious denomination that was foreign born. While certainly not as good as a measure
of members’ incomes or educational levels, mean ministers’ salaries are generally consis-
tent with what we know of denominations’ class positions from the earliest American sur-
veys, the ﬁrst of which was conducted by Gallup in 1939 ðCantril 1943Þ.
15Margaret Sanger Papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northhampton,
Mass.
16This is not to say that involvement with the ABCL was not an important indication of
other qualities, particularly feminism: the religious groups involved with it were among
the ﬁrst to make pronouncements on birth control. Periodical research suggests that they
were more feminist in their orientation than the other early liberalizers andmore strongly
supported woman suffrage. However, overall, a denomination’s views toward feminism
do not explain the stance it ultimately took in these ﬁrst debates over contraception. Only
about half of the early liberalizers were in favor of suffrage or ordained women, and only
a third of them had an autonomous women’s organization ðsee Wilde ½2013 for more
informationÞ.
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have been brought into the birth control movement not by the ABCL but by
one of Sanger’s closest organizational allies, the American Eugenics Society
ðAESÞ.
The premier eugenics education association at the time ðLudmerer 1972;
Mehler 1988; Rosen 2004; Franks 2005Þ, the AES cultivated close ties with
its “eugenic apostles” ðSherbon 1928, p. 3Þ, most of whom were “nationally
prominent ministers” and rabbis ðMehler 1988, p. 88; Leon 2004, p. 8Þ. In
contrast to the ABCL, the AES had well-funded standing committees, es-
pecially the Committee for Cooperation with Clergymen ðhereafter, Com-
mitteeÞ and regular outreach campaigns and columns in Eugenics written
for and by religious leaders, all dedicated to communicating with Amer-
ica’s religious elite.
Table 2 demonstrates that this outreach was successful. Twelve of the
28 denominations in our sample had representatives on the Committee.
Even more denominations had ministers submit sermons to the Commit-
tee’s biannual contests for the best sermon on eugenics.17 Almost all these
denominations also expressed strong support for eugenics in their periodi-
cals. More importantly, all of those that would ultimately express support,
whether ofﬁcially or unofﬁcially, for birth control expressed strongly eugen-
icist views in their periodicals.
In the mid-1920s articles from eugenicist religious groups that touched
on eugenics generally echoed AES beliefs and priorities. Legislatively speak-
ing, they supported immigration restriction and involuntary sterilization.
More generally, they promoted positive eugenics, the idea that “desirable”
people shouldhavemore ðat least fourÞ children ðseeGlass 1986;Rosen 2004Þ.
However, by the late 1920s the AES began to campaign for the legali-
zation of contraceptive methods and information. It did so because, in large
part as a result of Sanger’s efforts, its members had concluded that poor im-
migrants were having such large families because they did not have access
to doctors ðup until that point, the only legal way individuals could obtain
contraceptivesÞ.
Some, but not all, of the religious groups afﬁliated with the AES threw
their weight and legitimacy behind the AES’s campaign and began mak-
ing pronouncements about the legalization of contraceptives. Those who
did believed that it was their religious duty to make pronouncements on
such issues because they were believers in the social gospel.
17The 1926 sermons survived, as did the cover letters from the sermons submitted to the
1928 competition. Together, these gave us a total of 68 sermons submitted by the pastors
of 68 churches ðcounting multiple submissions only onceÞ, of which we were able to
place 62 AES papers ð42/44 from 1926 and 20/24 from 1928Þ, or 91% in denomination
after extensive research.
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PROGRESSIVE PROTESTANTISM AND THE SOCIAL
GOSPEL MOVEMENT
The social gospel movement ﬁrst emerged in the United States around the
late 1880s and remained a strong force in American religion for the next
50 years ðMay 1949; Carter 1956; Hopkins 1967; Hutchinson 1992; Phillips
1996; Marsden 2006Þ.18 Reacting to “a series of large-scale, violent labor
conﬂicts,” social gospelers tended to be not laborers but rather much more
elite Protestants troubled by the inequality that they saw as causing labor
strife ðMay 1949, p. 91Þ.
Active social reformers ðCarter 1956; Hopkins 1967; Rosen 2004Þ, social
gospelers believed that Christ would return only after humans had ﬁnished
preparing the earth for his arrival and that doing so required eradicating a
number of social ills, especially poverty and war ðMay 1949, pp. 184–85Þ.19
Social gospelers had a particular focus on urban slums in industrialized
cities,whichwasmore thanapparent in supporters’periodicals.For example,
the Christian Church’sHerald of Gospel Liberty asserted that “no man who
opposes the social gospel ever has spent much time in the receiving ward of a
great city hospital, where the bruised and maimed and dying are carried in
from the shops and streets” ð1924a, p. 1036Þ.20
Although a systematic study of supporters and critics of the theology has
been lacking, researchers agree that supporters were mainly elite, northern
denominations ðMay 1949; Hopkins 1967Þ, including even Reform Jews
ðCarter 1956, pp. 2, 4Þ. Social gospelers were quite aware of their priv-
ileged position vis-à-vis those they sought to help, as the following quote
from the Congregationalist ð1925, p. 68Þ indicates:
18Although most studies of the movement argue that it was in decline by the 1920s, Carter
found that it was revitalized by the Depression, with groups blazing “forth with all the old
vigor” by 1932 ð1956, p. 143Þ, a ﬁnding conﬁrmed by our primary research.
19Many have assumed that prohibition and abolition were major precursors to the
movement ðWhite and Hopkins 1976Þ, but we found that both were only weakly corre-
lated with belief in the social gospel. Less than two-thirds of strong social gospelers were
abolitionists, and 40% of those denominations that had beenwell-known abolitionists did
not express strong support for the social gospel. More than a quarter of those opposed to
the social gospel were prohibitionists—mostly from the South ðfor more information, see
Wilde ½2013Þ. Many have also assumed that fundamentalists rejected the social gospel,
but we found that only half of those who self-identiﬁed as fundamentalists rejected the
theology, a ﬁnding that is consistent with Marsden’s ð2006Þ argument that not all fun-
damentalists eschewed social reform.
20 It is safe to assume that this quote was at least poorly directed at members. The
Christian Church was the most rural strong social gospelers in our sample, with only
15% of its members living in urban areas circa 1926 ðsee table 3Þ. Its greater support for
the social gospel when compared to other more rural churches seems to have been a
result of its interest in merging with the much more urban Congregationalist Church,
which did happen in 1930.
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The people who bear the burdens of modern industry and suffer from its moral
limitations are, on the whole, not in the churches. The people in the churches
are the higher middle classes who reap whatever advantages modern machine
industry brings to the few and the lower middle classes who enjoy the comforts
and conveniences. . . . We can, therefore, if we want to, remain gloriously
oblivious to the task of humanizing industry. . . . ½This increases the bur-
den for every prophet of social righteousness who insists on applying Christ’s
gospel to industrial relationships.
Like belief in eugenics and race suicide, we found that belief in the so-
cial gospel was prominent among more than half ð16/28Þ of the denomi-
nations in our sample ðsee table 2Þ. However, while this is the same pro-
portion of denominations that believed in eugenics, nearly half of the
eugenicists in our sample were not big social gospelers, and nearly half of
social gospelers rejected eugenics ðseeﬁg. 1Þ.However,when the leaders of a
denomination did believe in the social gospel andwere also concerned about
race suicide, began to see birth control in a new light.
THE EARLY LIBERALIZERS
More than a quarter of the largest and most prominent American religious
groups liberalized on birth control in the mere two years between 1929 and
1931. These groups were mostly mainline Protestants and thus founding
members of the organizational center of mainline Protestantism, the Fed-
eral Council of Churches ðFCCÞ, which also came out with a statement in
favor of birth control in 1931. However, they were joined by Reform Jews,
as well as Unitarians and Universalists, whose religious beliefs were too
heterodox for them to be considered Christian and were thus unwelcome
in the FCC. Furthermore, there were many mainline Protestant members
of the FCC that did not liberalize. Instead of membership in the FCC, it
was their afﬁliations with the AES that united the early liberalizers.
Undaunting Belief in Eugenics
The early liberalizers were not shy about their belief in the importance
of heredity, their support for the AES, or the scientiﬁc application of eugen-
ics in general. For example, the American Unitarian Association’s periodical
the Christian Register ðwhich published at least two articles promoting eu-
genics annually between 1929–31Þ asked rather matter of factly: “Shall we
harness heredity to produce better types of cattle, dogs, and horses, and do
nothing with it to produce better types of men? Surely as human beings we
are as much entitled to the beneﬁts of good breeding as are the brutes. If
eugenics were to accomplish nothing more than the giving to the members
of society a sound physical birthright, would not that in itself be a stupen-
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dous achievement?” ðMiller 1932, p. 516Þ. The article closed by asserting:
“The church has a responsibility for the improvement of the human stock”
ðMiller 1932, p. 516Þ. Similarly, theMethodist Episcopal Church’sChristian
Advocate asked, “If we do a little selecting with ﬁgs and pigs and mice why
not use the same common sense with men?” ðStockdale 1931, p. 122Þ.
For eugenicists, and the religious leaders who supported them, the “se-
lecting” that was currently happening was disastrous. “Undesirables” were
having far too many children, as all of the early liberalizers lamented. For
example, the Universalist’s Christian Leader cautioned, “The most alarm-
ing tendency of our time is found in the low birth-rate among the superior
breeds and the high birth-rate among the inferior. Without much question
we are breeding twice as fast from the worst as from the best. No observ-
ing and thinking person can overlook this problem” ðFletcher 1930, p. 663Þ.
These groups saw differential birth rates as a result of the fact that “birth
control is already practiced virtually everywhere by the well-to-do classes”
ðFrisch 1926, p. 103; Israel 1929, p. 86Þ, as Reform Jews noted. Cognizant
of the “danger to society . . . the decline of the birth rate among the more
educated and privileged classes” created, by the late 1920s, these denomi-
nations decided that there was “need for birth control among the poorer
classes of society,” as the Quaker periodical the Friend argued ðFurnas
1930, p. 571Þ.
These religious leaders saw class differences as hereditary. Thus, their
solution was that the highly educated should breed more, not that all
people should become more highly educated. These beliefs are especially
apparent in statements that explicitly reference race suicide. For example,
the newly merged periodical the Congregationalist and Herald of Gospel
Liberty insisted, “Every marriage must have a minimum of three children
in order to fulﬁll its social obligation in maintaining the present level of
population. . . . Those who are able must average four or more in order to
prevent race suicide. Right here we face the alarming situation that so far
as the educated people are concerned race suicide has already begun”
ðSpoolman 1932, p. 1336Þ. Similarly, the UnitarianChristian Register ð1930,
p. 586Þ warned, “The self-evident fact that the desirable classes are not re-
producing themselves, and that the weaklings are, is ominous for the future.
The average woman American college graduate has only one and a half
children when she ought to have four, if the members of her class are to be
kept up.”
The uneducated who were so rapidly breeding were a part of ðin the
words of the early liberalizersÞ “the onrushing tide of mankind” ðWoodruff
1931, p. 397Þ, “the ﬂood of undesirables” who had come “to our shores”
from foreign lands ðHerald of Gospel Liberty 1924c, p. 101Þ.
Table 3 demonstrates that the early liberalizers were among the oldest,
most urban, and most northeastern of the denominations, with the smallest
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growth rates. As a comparison of ﬁgures 2 and 3 demonstrates, they
were concentrated in the same areas with the greatest inﬂux of Roman
Catholic immigrants.21
Just as they documented birthrate differentials between the native and
foreign born, or the desirable and undesirable, early liberalizers noted the
rapid growth of the Roman Catholic Church, which coincided with this
immigration. Sometimes they even directly compared Catholic and Protes-
tant birthrates, as did the Unitarians when they reported that “the Catho-
lic birth rate in this country is seventy per cent. higher than the birth rate for
the country as a whole” and warned that Catholics were “increasing nearly
ﬁve times as rapidly as non-Catholics” ðChristian Register 1931, p. 514Þ.
The increase of the Catholic population was a threat because Catholic
immigrants, and especially their children, were voters. Complaining, for ex-
ample, that America had become “the dumping ground of the least prom-
ising stock of the nations of southern Europe,” Methodist pastor Rever-
end George Fetter warned his congregants that “the largest percentage of
future American voters were coming from the city’s most unpromising en-
vironment and in many cases from its most deﬁcient stock.”22 Immigrants
were continually painted as easily “exploited ðand by their own raceÞ”
ðStelzle 1930, p. 273Þ or “too easily controlled by the process of suggestion,”
particularly “by politicians” ðHolmes 1930, p. 221Þ as separate articles in
Presbyterian Magazine lamented. Other groups simply referred to them as
“ignorant,” and therefore dangerous, as did the following article from the
Congregationalist Christian Church’s periodical:
Speaking a foreign language, many of them, bewildered by the strangeness of
their environs, making no contacts with all that means America to us, save
through the ward politician and the foreman in some factory, how are we
going to build them into a worthful citizenship? . . . The problem seemed
utterly hopeless while our immigration doors stood wide open. It is now
clariﬁed to this extent that we have largely stopped all fresh invasions. But we
have millions of such people on our hands. How are we going to lift so vast a
horde to the bare minimum of what constitutes real American manhood and
womanhood? . . . Given ignorance and poverty almost anything can happen,
and we have these forces at work in some form or other throughout almost half
our population. ðElmore 1931, pp. 894–95Þ
Birth control was an obvious solution, given the ever-increasing Cath-
olic population and the political realities that came with it. Of course, it was
only a solution if poor Catholics would use it—something that concerned
21Of course, there were Jewish immigrants in these areas; however, Jews were much
smaller in proportion than Catholics and do not seem to have been as big of a concern to
eugenists ðfor more on Jews and the eugenic movement see Wilde ½2013Þ.
22Reverend George C. Fetter to First Baptist Church in Ottawa, Ill., 1926, “Baptist
Sermon on Eugenics.” AES papers, box 14, folder “George C. Fetter 1926,” American
Philosophical Society ðAPSÞ, Philadelphia.
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many early liberalizers. Sanger collected data not only on the race, eth-
nicity, education, and other indications of class from the women who used
her clinics but also on religion. The ﬁndings were pretty clear: under-
privileged Catholic women would use birth control if it was made available
ðBirth Control Review 1929; Lilien 1929; Marion 1929; Robinson 1930;
Yarros 1931; Wiggam 1935Þ.
Convinced, the early liberalizers began making calls for the legalization
of birth control, which often sounded like the following the third-place-
winning sermon from the 1928 AES competition: “Knowledge of birth con-
trol should be widely and freely disseminated, so that among certain groups
in our civilization there may be not more, but fewer and better children”
ðBishop 1929, pp. 343–44Þ.
Of course, this sermon was not an ofﬁcial statement by the Congrega-
tionalists. That would take another two years to transpire. And, as table 2
indicates, many denominations that did not ofﬁcially liberalize had pas-
tors submit sermons to the AES competition. What set the early liberalizers
apart from these other denominations was the way in which their con-
cerns about race suicide combined with their clear, undaunted belief in the
rightness and importance of the social gospel—a belief that led them to
have deep concerns about poverty, war, and social injustice and, crucially,
compelled them to take steps to address these problems.
Devout Social Gospelers
The early liberalizers deeply believed that social activism was a necessary
part of being a good Christian. For these social gospelers, a focus on indi-
vidual salvation was “not enough,” as the Congregationalist insisted ðChal-
mers 1931, p. 959Þ. The reason was that, as the Universalists put it, “The
Kingdom” would come “not by divine magic” but from “sacriﬁcial activity”
ðHoyt 1930, p. 370Þ. This point was often emphasized in strong messianic
tones, as in the following quote from Presbyterian Magazine: “Organized
Christianity . . . cannot rest satisﬁed with a mere improvement of the exist-
ing social order. . . .The Christian ideal ½is . . . the Kingdom of God widened
and extended until all men and all interests, everywhere, are brought be-
neath its sway—‘Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done in earth as it is in
heaven’” ðMcDowell 1931, p. 335Þ.
This same article enumerated the “urgent social questions” social gospel-
ers sought to address “wealth and poverty, luxury and want, capital and
labor, peace andwar” ðMcDowell 1931, p. 335Þ. As this list suggests, much of
the movement’s focus was on the perceived injustice of the modern in-
dustrial system. Part and parcel of their critique of industrialism, social
gospelers focused on urban problems, the “abnormal congestion of popu-
lations in cities” that had created “a series of problems in America with
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which we have yet found no effective way to cope” ðMarquis 1925, pp. 543–
44Þ. Clearly aware that immigrants especially suffered from the effects of
industrialization, they chronicled the problems associated with urban child
labor, as did the following article from theHerald of Gospel Liberty: “Large
numbers of children under ten years old, and some of them as young as
three or four years, are employed in the manufacture of artiﬁcial ﬂowers, in
embroidery work, garment making, and other tenement occupations. . . .
The artiﬁcial June roses which appear in the Fifth Avenue shops are made
by the baby ﬁngers of Italian children, who are paid twenty cents a gross”
ð1924b, p. 221Þ.
Given their concerns about the plight of immigrants and the urban poor,
some social gospelers ðbut not all, as will become clear in the section on the
silent denominationsÞ concluded that birth control was essential to elimi-
nating poverty. For example, articles in the Protestant Episcopal Church’s
the Living Church asserted that “anyone who has had anything to do with
social service work will heartily endorse . . . birth control” ð1930, p. 580Þ.
However, although their support for birth control was driven by con-
cerns about urban poverty, their support for it was also deeply racialized.
Take, for example, the following quote from the Congregationalist, which
begins with a typical social gospel critique of inequality and class privilege
but soon moves to discussions of “quality”:
For many years the wealthy and the educated classes have proﬁted by modern
knowledge of contraceptive methods and techniques.
. . . Why must this knowledge remain a class privilege? . . . How long are we
going to allow the unreﬂective and helpless mass production of the weakest
and least ﬁt of our population to continue without attempting to shift the
emphasis from quantity to quality?
. . . When and how are . . . ministers and physicians going to be allowed to
give this priceless information to these unfortunate people who need it most?
ðThompson 1932, p. 1037Þ
In the end, their eugenic beliefs merged with the progressive Christian-
ity of the social gospel movement into a single cohesive belief system. This
is perhaps nowhere as elegantly exempliﬁed as it was in a sermon to a
Methodist Episcopal Church that was submitted to the 1926 AES com-
petition: In his sermon, the Reverend Rufus C. Baker told his congregation
at the First Methodist Episcopal Church in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
that “the problems confronted by the Church and by the Eugenicists are
the same, the motive is the same. United their program is complete. Co-
operative effort will accomplish the task. And the result will be a new Hu-
manity and a new earth, which is, in reality, the Kingdom of Heaven.”23
23Reverend Rufus C. Baker, 1926, “Methodist Sermon on Eugenics,”AES papers, box 13,
folder “Baker, Rufus C. 1926,” APS.
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THE UNOFFICIAL SUPPORTERS
In contrast to the nine denominations that did ofﬁcially liberalize, whose
leaders believed in both the social gospel and eugenics, four denominations
tried to pick a middle ground by expressing ðoften quite strongÞ support for
birth control but refraining from making that support ofﬁcial. For exam-
ple, the Northern Baptist Convention published 16 supportive articles on
birth control between 1929 and 1931 but never made an ofﬁcial pronounce-
ment.
Undaunting Belief in Eugenics
Their reluctance to make an ofﬁcial pronouncement was certainly not a
result of ambivalence about eugenics. With periodicals that emphasized
the importance of the Anglo race to the nation and expressed deep concern
about the country’s declining racial stock, these denominations were even
more eugenicist than some of the early liberalizers. If a belief in eugenics
was the only predictor of liberalization, not only should these denomina-
tions have been early liberalizers; they should have been ﬁrst.24 Instead,
these denominations refrained from making ofﬁcial pronouncements be-
cause they were more rural denominations that were distanced from urban
problems and the social gospel movement. While they saw wisdom in mak-
ing contraceptive information accessible to those of lesser “racial stock”
ðBaptist 1930Þ, they failed to see such pronouncements as their religious
duty.
Without a doubt, the Northern Baptist Convention stands out for its
support for eugenics. It had more members on the AES Committee than
any other denomination ðsee table 2Þ, and its periodical the Baptist fre-
quently reported on and expressed support for the AES and eugenic
principles and beliefs in general.25 For example, in 1925 theBaptistmatter-
of-factly informed its readers that “through the committee on cooperation
with clergymen,” the AES would “bring to the attention of the churches the
24This is true with the exception of the Evangelical Synod of North America. Its peri-
odical, the Evangelical Herald discussed eugenics less frequently, with only one clearly
pro-eugenics article published during the peak years of discussion. Correspondingly, it
was the most hesitant to offer its support for birth control, not doing so until 1931, and
only in one article. However, both articles left little room for interpretation. The article
on race suicide was concerned lest “families of good blood die out” ðEvangelical Herald,
1929, p. 685Þ, and the article on birth control was clear in its support, recommending
that “the birth control movement and the recent report of the Federal Council Com-
mittee on Marriage and the Home should be considered and studied” and promoting
“intelligent, pure, reverent sex information, of which birth control, in the best sense of
the term, is but the climax” ð1931, p. 363Þ.
25The Baptist published approximately one article per year between 1929 and 1931
promoting eugenics or the AES ðBaptist 1929b, 1930; Beyl 1929Þ.
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message of eugenics” ð1925b, p. 738Þ. Likewise, the United Presbyterian ar-
gued that “there is no doubt that the inﬂuences of heredity are tremendous”
and reminded readers that “blood will tell. Children inherit many of the
characteristics and tendencies of their ancestors, not only of their own fa-
thers and mothers, but of those farther back along the ancestral line”
ð1929, p. 10Þ.
Like the early liberalizers, these denominations were deeply concerned
about race suicide. An article in the Baptist in 1924 criticized “successful
individuals” who “place ambition, ease, luxury, and freedom of travel be-
fore marriage and rearing a family. They are practicing race suicide” ð1924,
p. 286Þ. In an article that quoted the father of eugenics, Francis Galton, the
Evangelical Herald decried the use of birth control by “cultured classes”
because it “seriously interferes with the progress of race culture and to that
extent is a sin against church and state because through it too many fami-
lies of good blood die out and the burden of progress in civilization is shifted
to shoulders least able to bear it” ð1929, p. 683Þ.
Of course, concerns about race suicide were deeply intertwined with
negative views of immigrants. But, in contrast to the early liberalizers, who
tended not to differentiate much between types of immigrants, the unof-
ﬁcial supporters emphasized the undesirability of “new” immigrants. The
reason was likely that the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Norwegian
Lutheran Church, and the United Presbyterian Church of North America
all seemed to have fairly strong identities as immigrant churches. Thus,
they emphasized the differences between their ancestors and the current
cohort of immigrants, arguing, for example, as did the Evangelical Herald,
that “a tremendous change has come over the character of the immigrant.
Formerly the ﬁnest class of Europeans came over, now some of the worst
class come over” ðLehmann 1924, p. 41Þ.
These concerns about class and character were racialized—geographic
and ethnic differences were often also mentioned. After reminding its read-
ers that “we have been talking for years about the perils of immigration,”
the United Presbyterian told its readers that “immigrants largely come,
not as formerly, from western and northern Europe, but from eastern and
southern Europe and from Asia.” The same article went on to stress that
these new immigrants were a safety concern, a political concern, and last
but not least, also a religious, or “spiritual” concern for the nation. “A large
part of our lawlessness and our crime are perpetrated by these people.
They regard liberty as license to do what they wish. They do not value our
institutions or our spirit. We ask, How can we incorporate such an het-
erogeneous mass into a political and spiritual unity?” ð1925, p. 4Þ. Echoing
the political ðand ethnicÞ concerns expressed in the quote above, another
United Presbyterian article argued that new immigrants had already de-
stroyed American society, character, and institutions:
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The vast alien invasion of our shores destroyed our distinctive American char-
acter, perverted our institutions, displaced American labor from its rightful
position and gave America its present evil fame as themost lawless nation in the
world. Sicilians and aliens of that type have built America’s underworld and
have made gangland a power before which even Federal authority, our chief
executive being the spokesman, has confessed itself helpless and undone.
ðMarlin 1932, p. 2Þ
As the mention of “Sicilians” above suggests, these periodicals often men-
tioned the new immigrants’ “inferior” racial, ethnic, or genetic character-
istics. In an article that mentioned “under-sized” folk, the Lutheran Church
Herald emphasized that “the Norwegians ½who immigrate . . . are very
different from the people ½from . . .Eastern and Southern Europe. They are
not the middlemen, the sweatshop workers, the peddlers, the petty trades-
men, the under-sized, dazed-looking, excitable, illiterate folk from the ag-
ricultural and town slums of the south and east who pour into the slums of
America each year under the 3 per cent law in sufﬁcient numbers to pop-
ulate a good-sized city” ð1924, p. 453Þ. The article then went on to assert
that newer immigrants “have all had an equal chance, as has everyone in
America,” but “weren’t born equal in intelligence or ability. Consequently
the bulk of the Northwestern European immigrants have become a part of
America while the bulk of the Southeastern European immigrants have
remained Southeastern Europeans” ðp. 453Þ.
Their belief that superior genetic material was restricted to Anglo-Saxons
was supported, they argued, by the crucial role Anglo-Saxons played in
the founding and settling of the United States. The United Presbyterian ar-
gued,
The missionary value of all men is not the same. Men are born equal in their
rights, but they are not equal in their ﬁtness and ability to serve. They vary in
their talents and powers. . . .
. . . God needed the white Anglo-Saxon race. . . .
. . . In the discovery and colonization of America, God was opening the way
for the Anglo-Saxon people, imbued with the spirit of the evangelical gospel, to
become a great nation.
. . . Deep-seated in the mind and plan of God, lay the Anglo-Saxon race and
country, America, strategic in position, powerful and rich in numbers and
wealth. ðHutchison 1930, p. 4Þ
Of course one of the most signiﬁcant differences between the immigrants
of old and new was their religion, something that did not escape the notice
of these denominations. The Lutheran Herald wrote that “the newcomers
bring with them their particular forms of faith” ðStub 1931, p. 39Þ. All these
denominations kept close track of the American Roman Catholic Church’s
growth. The Evangelical Herald published a two-part article doing so
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ðEnders 1922a, 1922bÞ. The Baptist variously reported that Detroit was
“more than half”Catholic ðLovett 1929, p. 1448Þ, that conditionswere “even
more appalling” in New York and Chicago ðGleiss 1924, p. 57Þ, and in-
formed readers that the Catholic population had grown from 600,000 to
17,616,000 in the past 100 years ðBaptist 1925a, p. 219Þ.
Given how quickly the Catholic population was growing and how little
Protestant denominations admitted approaching them, if at all, in con-
version efforts,26 these denominations expressed concern about their po-
litical futures, asserting, for example, as did the Evangelical Herald, that
“there is very good reason to fear the election of a Roman Catholic presi-
dent” ð1924, p. 497Þ.
In sum, like the early liberalizers, these four denominations were eu-
genicists who were concerned about immigrants, immigrants’ greater fer-
tility, and the threat it posed for their political power. In other words, they
were deeply concerned about race suicide. However, unlike the early lib-
eralizers, these four denominations could not bring themselves to actually
make an ofﬁcial pronouncement. What separated these three denomina-
tions from the early liberalizers was their rejection of the social gospel.
Doubting the Social Gospel
None of these denominations were strong social gospelers. The United
Presbyterian and the Lutheran Church Heraldmentioned the social gospel
only once during the time period of our analysis, and the Evangelical
Herald only indirectly. The United Presbyterian asserted that while “there
is an important place for the ‘social gospel,’ . . . individual conviction and
conversion is the primary thing, and it needs to be kept in the ﬁrst place”
ð1931, p. 6; emphasis in originalÞ. The Lutheran Church Herald cautioned
its readers:
The social gospel has confronted the modern church with a tremendous ob-
ligation in which there inheres a great peril. In a word, that peril can be stated
thus: How can the Church function to make the social order Christian without
ceasing to be a church? How can religion effectively apply its sanctions to the
ideals of social morality without losing its character as religion? Such questions
open up a vast problem. One thing, we may be assured, the Church must not
do, on peril of losing its own soul—that is to make itself a political partisan
agency on behalf of any cause, however ideal and desirable. ð1931, p. 357Þ
In a pretty clear criticism of religious activism, the Evangelical Herald asserted
that “the millennium is not in sight because national prohibition has been
26The Baptist acknowledged in 1929 that “we were not Americanizing them, nor did we
care to” ðMcAllister 1929, p. 72Þ.
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secured, and even if the new laws are rigidly enforced everywhere poverty
and disease, vice and crime, corrupt politics, insanity and feeble-mindedness
will still remain. The kingdom of God, that is, the reign of God in the affairs
and relationships of men, is brought about not by legislation” ð1919, p. 1Þ.
Although the data presented on table 3 are not precise enough to dem-
onstrate this deﬁnitively ðany county with more than 2,000 people was
counted as urban in the 1926 censusÞ, ﬁgure 4 suggests that these mid-
western denominations were much more rural than the early liberalizers.
This, in and of itself, meant that these groups were much more distant from
the problems of urban industrialization that predominated in the North-
east and were the focus of social gospelers.
However, while the rural and midwestern location of these denomina-
tions was obviously crucial, it would be misleading to reduce the expla-
nation for these groups’ rejection of the social gospel to such geographic
factors alone. Being less northeastern and more rural was also likely cor-
related with a lower educational and class status.
That all of these factors were important is suggested by what for some
will be the surprising presence of the Northern Baptist Convention in the
category of denominations that were not strong social gospelers. Although
the convention possessed a “small but inﬂuential Social Gospel minority”
ðWhite and Hopkins 1976, p. 36Þ, including key social gospel theologian
Walter Rauschenbusch, the Baptist took a middle ground about the move-
ment, asking to be delivered from “any gospel that is not both and com-
pletely saving and social” ð1929a, p. 214; see also Wells 1930Þ. The conven-
tion had “a large rural membership” ðMay 1949, p. 190Þ, and its members
were the “least-educated” of American Protestants ðPope 1948, p. 88Þ.27
As a result, and despite their deep fears about race suicide and its po-
litical and racial implications, the Northern Baptists saw birth control as
an issue that “every individual must ultimately face and settle” himself, as
theBaptist argued: “Only indirectly are religious issues involved. Primarily
they are social and economic, and the religious element must be determined
not upon authority” ð1931, p. 425Þ. In contrast to the social gospelers, who
saw addressing social and economic issues not only as within the purview
of religion but as a religious duty, Northern Baptists and the other unof-
ﬁcial supporters saw birth control as an individual decision, albeit with
important racial implications. They thus chose to offer only unofﬁcial sup-
port to their more activist fellow religious leaders.
27Pope does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Baptists. Although North-
ern Baptists were most likely better educated than Southern Baptists, there is no question
that they remained less educated than other Protestants and were not a part of the Prot-
estant establishment ðBaltzell 1964Þ.
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THE CRITICS
Of course, support was far from the only stance denominations could make
at this time. Six of the largest American religious denominations openly
criticized the early liberalizers and the denominations that supported them.
As ﬁgure 1 indicates, all the critics rejected both the social gospel and race
suicide concerns. However, while they had these two crucial qualities in
common, the reasons behind these beliefs, particularly their rejection of
race suicide, were almost diametrically opposed into two groups.
The ﬁrst group of critics were mostly immigrant denominations, in-
cluding the Roman Catholic Church, Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod,
and Orthodox Jews. Aware that immigrants and their large families were
the targets of eugenicists, they rejected the assumptions inherent to the
eugenics movement. Still outsiders in America, as was the Church of Jesus
Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, none of these groups were a part of the
Protestant establishment and were so distant from the social gospel move-
ment that they rarely felt the need to mention it.
While immigrant critics were predominantly situated in the Northeast
alongside the early liberalizers and unofﬁcial supporters, the other group of
critical denominations lived in the South. Devout eugenicists who ben-
eﬁted from the institutionalization of racial differences via Jim Crow, these
groups were insulated from the numerical and political concerns that ob-
sessed their northern counterparts and openly admitted that they were not
concerned about race suicide.
Together, the wide variety of groups that criticized birth control reform
demonstrates the importance of the factors discussed so far, particularly
the importance of race suicide concerns, and not simply belief in eugenics.
Immigrant Critics: Aware That They Were the Targets
Without question the most outspoken and visible critic of birth control
ðUnderwood 1957; Tentler 2004Þ, the Roman Catholic Church accused
eugenicists of being racists who were “preaching ‘race suicide’” ðJ.W.K.
1925, p. 306Þ and classism ðHoward 1930Þ. Articles in America questioned
eugenicists’ arguments ðWalsh 1924Þ, the use of “science,” and especially
eugenicists’ emphasis on heredity over environment ðBenedik 1924Þ. They
leave little doubt that Catholics saw eugenics as thinly ðor not evenÞ veiled
anti-Catholicism. For example, one article in America directly accused eu-
genicists of trying to shut “out the immigrants from Italy ½and Poland”
because they “were the Catholics who had large families and were the chief
contributors to the growth of the Catholic population in the United States”
ðMurphy 1925, p. 373Þ.
However, although they might not have been as well known for it,
immigrant-rich groups shared Catholic skepticism of race suicide and eu-
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genics, even those who were Anglo-Saxon Protestants ðif not yet middle-
classÞ, such as the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod.28 In fact, as was
the case for Catholics, it was difﬁcult to ﬁnd quotes that criticized birth
control without criticizing eugenics among both Lutherans and Orthodox
Jews. The Lutheran Witness variously referred to eugenicists as “quacks
and unscrupulous propagandists of birth control” ðSommer 1935b, p. 114Þ
and “the little band of professors and men and women busybodies” who
were futilely “trying to apply to the human race . . . artiﬁcial stock-breeding
rules” ðSommer 1935a, p. 299Þ. One Lutheran Witness article dismissed
eugenicists’ promotion of smaller families as “hot air” and argued that “a fa-
vorite slogan of those sponsoring the artiﬁcial limiting of families is: ‘Fewer
children, but better ones.’ . . . Between the size of families and the goodness
of the children there is no relation at all” ðGraebner 1931, p. 120Þ.
Orthodox Jews criticized “Anglo-Saxon and other supremacy claims”
ðBurstein 1924, p. 784Þ and condemned birth control and eugenics in the
same breath in their periodical the Jewish Forum: “Much could be said of
the wisdom of the Bible on the subject of eugenics, and of its attitude on
birth control. We scientists may justly condemn the extravagant opinions
of some so-called preachers of the gospel, who actually rush in and air their
views on a medical and scientiﬁc subject where—not the angels but—
physicians and men of science fear to tread” ðMacht 1931, p. 380Þ.
Even the Mormons, who were not immigrants and not often eugenicists’
targets, but were culturally marginal nonetheless, criticized eugenicists.
Emphasizing pride in the fact that Mormons were the “most composite
people in the most composite nation in the world,” one Mormon writer
asserted, “It is by no means an accident that the greatest nations of the past
and of the present are of a mixed blood” ðEvans 1924, p. 131Þ.
These outsider-immigrant critics were joined by groups that might seem
like extremely unlikely allies, including the vehemently anti-Catholic South-
ern Baptist Convention. To understand how these unlikely bedfellows came
together, we must understand how racial concerns differed between the
North and the South such that whites in the North were concerned about
Catholic immigrants destroying their race and nation but whites in the
South viewed them as possible eugenic helpmates.
Southern Critics: The Geography of Race Suicide
Figure 5 demonstrates that for the most part, non-Catholic critics lived
outside of the Northeast and that a large portion lived in the South. With
28Pope argued that “the Lutheran denominations are harder to classify, because of their
closer association with farmers, with particular ethnic backgrounds, and with skilled
workers,” but were generally similar to Catholics, if much more rural ð1948, p. 89Þ.
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high birthrates and living where “the only socially inferior race was clearly
separated by the accident of color” as eugenicist Prescott F. Hall wrote in
1919 ðp. 125Þ, southern white denominations tended to be quite devoted
to beliefs in white superiority and supportive of eugenic principals in gen-
eral. However, as Hall also noted, “until very recently there was no immi-
gration at all” in the South ðp. 125Þ. Furthermore, southern whites had
higher birthrates than northernwhites, and,more important, birthrates that
were higher than or equivalent to southern blacks.29 In combination, these
factors created religious denominations that were devoted to eugenics in
relationship to blacks but were relatively unconcerned about immigration
or immigrant birthrates. Instead, they argued that immigrants would “save
the country from stock deterioration” ðSparthey 1925, p. 715Þ.
That they were eugenicists was blatantly obvious in both the Southern
Baptist Convention’s newspaper the Christian Index and the Presbyte-
rian Church in the United States’ periodical Presbyterian Survey. For ex-
ample, the Christian Index asserted, “We must seek through eugenics and
euthenics to improve the bodies of men, through education, the minds of
men; through religion, the morals of men” ðMullins 1924, p. 7Þ. A Presby-
terian Survey article emphasized the importance of “family traits and ten-
dencies inherited from their forefathers” ðCartledge 1931, p. 554Þ.
However, while vehement eugenicists, southern groups were less critical
of immigrants than many other eugenicist groups. For example, one
Presbyterian Survey article asserted, “It is not true that we receive the
‘Scum of the earth,’ for the so-called ‘scum’ seldom has the ambition to
emigrate” ðHarkness 1925, p. 390Þ. Another article in the same periodical
went so far as to argue that
The student of eugenics and social science knows that our “primitive”American
stock is rapidly passing away . . . the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic stock. America is
the most heterogeneous country in the world. Its population is becoming more
and more complex. . . . We think it will save the country from stock deterio-
ration.
The history of the great nations of antiquity indicates that their downfall
was largely due to the decay of the stock—new blood was lacking in the veins of
the old weakened race. . . . The foreign-born population of America will be its
saviour . . . making it stronger. ðSparthey 1925, p. 715Þ
29A 1917 article in Scientiﬁc Monthly titled “Race Suicide” presented data that showed
that southern urban whites’ birth rate was 25% higher than southern urban blacks ð378
vs. 296 children under ﬁve years of age per 1,000 women ages 15–44Þ. In southern rural
areas, both were extremely high ð678 vs. 689Þ ðThompson 1917, p. 24Þ. In comparison,
the same article noted that in the north, “native white women of native parentage . . .
had borne an average of 2.5 children, while the white women of foreign parentage had
borne an average of 4.5 children ðp. 23Þ.
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Of course, immigrants could “save the race” only if their religion was
“ﬁxed,”because these groupswere deeply anti-Catholic, as the Index openly
admitted: “We Protestants are crowded in with Catholics, and they get on
our nerves” ðHerring 1924, p. 20Þ. Thus, while the early liberalizers worked
on curtailing immigration and immigrant fecundity, southern groups dis-
cussed them primarily as a missionary responsibility. For example, a Pres-
byterian Survey article that continually conﬂated ethnicity and religion with
a focus on Italians urged readers to “press on with undaunted courage and
unﬂinching sacriﬁce to the goal of making America Christian by winning
the immigrant to Christ” ð1925, p. 354Þ. Likewise, as a Christian Index
article urged, “Of foreigners in our Southland there are four million. They
have come seeking liberty from oppression, and relief from poverty. They
swarm our streets, work in our mines, commercialize our fruits, mend our
shoes, open laundries and go far in breaking down our Sabbath. If we do
not evangelize and train them, they will do us a great injury” ð1925, p. 17Þ.
However, while Roman Catholics were a religious problem, they were
not a racial problem. The Presbyterian Survey did not mention race sui-
cide or differential birthrates once during the eight years for which their
periodical was examined ð1919–20, 1925, and 1930–35Þ. This does not
seem to have been a result of a lack of familiarity with the term. For ex-
ample, the Christian Index published three articles in the four years for
which we were able to obtain the periodical that vaguely suggested the ex-
istence of differential birthrates and demonstrated an awareness of the is-
sue particularly for those in the North. For example, one of these articles
listed the names of some recent ðpresumably whiteÞ parents and proclaimed
happily, “We note with pleasurable satisfaction that Atlanta does not believe
in race suicide. Recently we had nineteen babies in the hospital at one time”
ðChristian Index 1924, p. 28Þ.
In sum, and consistent with racial formation theories ðOmi and Winant
1986Þ, in the North, where white Anglo-Saxon Protestants were more con-
cerned about being overtaken by Catholic immigrants, religion took on de-
cidedly more racialized terms. In the South, whites had racial privilege
based on a ﬁrmly established, state-sponsored, culturally accepted, and rig-
idly enforced color line. There, the religious difference between them and
immigrants was, if anything, more a rallying cry for proselytization than a
justiﬁcation for keeping immigrants from coming into the country and re-
producing.
However, while the reasons behind their lack of concern about race
suicide among both the immigrant and southern denominations could not
have been more different, their shared rejection of it led them to the same
solution: they openly opposed birth control, as long as they also rejected, or
at the very least were completely removed from, the social gospel.
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Immigrants’ and Southern White Denominations’ Distance
from the Social Gospel
Immigrant denominations seemed almost completely out of the loop re-
garding the social gospel movement. Neither the Roman Catholic Church,
Orthodox Jews, nor the Mormons mentioned the social gospel once in the
more than seven years of periodical analysis conducted for each of them.
The Lutheran Witness mentioned it only once, in an extremely dismissive
tone ðSommer 1934Þ.
In contrast to the immigrant denominations that simply seemed discon-
nected from the social gospel movement, the Southern Baptist Convention
and thePresbyterianChurch in theUnited States knewall toowellwhat sorts
of social activism were required by the movement and expressed very strong
views against the social gospel. For example, the Southern Baptist Conven-
tion asserted that “the times are proliﬁc of the ways in which men may
be saved.There is salvationbyeugenics and salvationby social service.There
is salvation by talking spirits and salvation by pleasant thoughts. There is
salvation by legislation and salvation by sanitation. But there is, in fact only
one salvation. There is no other way but Jesus” ðDawson 1924, p. 30Þ.
With strong feelings against the social gospel movement (or a lack of
engagement with it at all) and a rejection of race suicide concerns (because
they were outsiders or immigrants themselves or were whites living in the
South), this disparate living in the SouthÞ, this disparate group of denom-
inations ended up ﬁnding consensus around one important belief: birth con-
trol reform did not make sense racially, or religiously.
THOSE WHO REMAINED SILENT
Nine religious denominations were completely silent about birth control
throughout the 1930s, usually until the early 1960s. Not tightly concentrated
in the Northeast ðsee ﬁg. 6Þ, all these denominations were unconcerned
about race suicide. Correspondingly, most of these groups openly criticized
eugenicists’ beliefs and principles and looked favorably on immigration and
immigrants. As believers in the social gospel, these denominations had iden-
tities as religious activists.With their fellow religious activists promoting re-
ligious activism on birth control for reasons they could not support, silence
became their safest course of action.
Marginal Ethnicities — Skeptical of Eugenics
Not surprisingly, the majority of the denominations that remained silent on
birth control had racial or ethnic backgrounds that were more marginal
than the early liberalizers or unofﬁcial supporters and that pushed them to
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be critical of eugenics.30 Both traditionally black denominations were openly
critical of eugenics. The AfricanMethodist Episcopal Zion Church asserted,
“To go back to the assertion that your fathers’ character at the time of your
birth will be yours also sounds very much like fatalism. The idea is antag-
onistic to progress. If the assertion were true, then there would be no ad-
vance in civilization. . . . Let the Christian get away from heredity. Heredity!
What is heredity?” ðEvans 1925, pp. 10–11Þ. The National Baptist Con-
vention USA countered survival of the ﬁttest arguments, arguing that
“corporation, not conﬂict is the law of progress” and that “those who learn to
work together survive and grow strong; those who are always ﬁghting in-
evitably destroy each other” ðNational Baptist Union Review 1931, p. 2Þ.
Criticism of eugenicists was deﬁnitely not limited to the African-
American denominations, however, as almost every other denomination
that was silent on birth control also criticized eugenicist views. Although
statistics on the percentage of their members that were foreign born are
unfortunately not available for any denominations at this time, this was
particularly true for those groups whose periodicals suggested that they
still had a strong identity as recent immigrants ðthe Reformed Church in
the United States, the United Lutheran Church in America, and Conser-
vative JewsÞ.
These groups rejected or criticized eugenicists’ focus on heredity and
especially their focus on nature over nurture. Of all these denominations,
the Reformed Church in the United States was by far the strongest critic,
publishing eight articles that were critical of eugenics in 1924 alone.31 In
quote after quote, the Reformed Church Messenger emphasized the im-
portance of environment over heredity: “Parents have little control over
heredity. They have immense control over environment. Theirs is the re-
30That is, with the exception of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. The collapse of
the Methodist Quarterly Review in 1930, just as many groups were making their pro-
nouncements on birth control, has made coding the MECS’s position on birth control
conclusively next to impossible ðthey could have indicated unofﬁcial support or open
criticism of birth control reform at any point in the next year and a half after the journal
collapsed, or they could have simply remained silent, there is no way to know for certain
in the absence of a periodicalÞ. Their more positive views of immigrants and lack of
concern about race suicide are generally consistent with the position of other white
groups from the South. However, they do not seem to have been eugenicists. The only
article that touched on eugenics asserted that although physical descent matters, we
determine the “growth or retardation” of our children ðHammond 1924, p. 624Þ. As the
only white southern denomination that was a strong social gospeler, its silence is con-
sistent with the positions of the silent denominations presented in this section and with
the overall argument presented in the article, but given these data limitations, we do not
focus on the MECS as evidence for any of our claims.
31See Barnett ð1924Þ, Blemker ð1924Þ, Deer ð1924aÞ, Kern ð1924Þ, “Parents—Stop,
Look and Listen!” ð1924aÞ, “Put the Accent on Evangelism” ð1924bÞ, “Religion in the
Home” ð1924cÞ, and Schaeffer ð1924Þ. The year 1924 was not unique for this periodical.
In 1931 it published six articles that were critical of eugenics.
Religion and Birth Control Reform
1747
sponsibility of providing the best possible home atmosphere and envi-
ronment for the children to grow up in” ð1924c, p. 4Þ.
Like its articles on juvenile delinquency, the Reformed Church Messen-
ger’s articles on immigration made strong statements about immigration
reform in general, particularly in an article titled “Race Prejudice and the
Immigrant,” in which it argued that “instead of an impartial, fair and just
consideration of the needs of the country, the determining factors ½of im-
migration reformwere politics and racial prejudice” and went on to criticize
the “gospel of the intrinsic superiority of the native-born American ðand all
Americans—with the exception of the Indians—were at one time foreignersÞ
½and its racial discrimination against the non-Nordic nationalities” ðSpinka
1925, p. 7Þ.
Other denominations with strong immigrant identities expressed similar
sentiments. Mordecai Kaplan, leader of the Conservative Jewish movement,
well-known for recruiting recent Jewish immigrants, wrote that Jews had
“a strong antipathy against any attempt, be it scientiﬁc or religious, to make
out a case for inherent distinctions between races and peoples” ð1929, p. 10Þ.
The United Lutheran Church in America’s the Lutheran insisted that
“the vast majority of the present-day immigrants are good, clean, indus-
trious Christian men and women” ðFreas 1930, p. 8Þ and harshly criticized
eugenicist reasoning in another article:
You can take the baby son of respectable parents and put him in an envi-
ronment where he becomes a thief, and you can take the son of thieves and
make him a bank president. It is up to you and the environment with which
you surround him. In other words . . . “Train up a child in the way in which
he should go, and when he is old, he will not depart from it.”
. . .What will do wonders to makemuch talk about heredity look like “bunk”
is Christian training, Christian discipline. That is the bedrock upon which
character is built. ð1927, p. 13Þ
In separate articles the Reformed Church in America’s Christian Intelli-
gencer urged readers, “Don’t make the immigrant hate America. Make him
love America. In other words, be an American,—and be a Christian” ð1930,
p. 245Þ anddeclared, “The Interpreterhasno sympathywith thenarrowviews
which ﬁnd expression in the slogan ‘100 per cent American,’ for both Amer-
ica and Americans change with the passing of the years. We shall each of us
make our contribution to the ultimate nation if, regardless of the racial stock
from which we individually have sprung, we do our part in making the in-
evitable change a development of a better America” ðDemarest 1924, p. 358Þ.
But, even those silent groups whose periodicals did not indicate strong
identities as recent immigrants strongly criticized eugenics.32 For example,
32The sole exceptions were the Churches of Christ, whose Gospel Advocate said little
about social issues and nothing about eugenics, and the MECS, whoseMethodist Quar-
terly Review collapsed in 1930.
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before concluding insistently that “God is the judge of racial equality, not
America!,” the Disciples of Christ’s urged readers of World Call to offer
“sincere, wholesome friendship” to immigrants ðButchart 1924, p. 24Þ.
Belief in the Social Gospel: At Odds with Fellow Religious Activists
Many of the silent denominations were as adamant about the social gospel
as the early liberalizers. For example, the Reformed Church Messenger
dismissed personal religious devotion disconnected from social reform,
arguing that “effort to bring the social, political and industrial relationships
of men into harmony with the standards set by the Lord Jesus Himself”
gloriﬁes God ðSchaeffer 1924, p. 30Þ.
The Disciples of Christ’s periodical World Call was emphatic about
promoting the social gospel, declaring that it sought to “inspire activity in
the social gospel, to promote every form of church activity that touches
social welfare, to . . . promote social justice and . . . bring in peace where
there is strife, brotherhood where there is conﬂict, justice where there are
iniquities, and good will where there is misunderstanding” ð1929, p. 45Þ.
Although they were relatively rare, there were indications that the de-
nominations that remained silent were aware of the eugenicist views of the
early liberalizers who were their fellow social gospelers. For example, the
Reformed Church Messenger reprinted an article titled “Consequences of
the Neglect of Childhood” from the much more eugenically inclined Her-
ald of Gospel Liberty ðDeer 1924Þ.33 The short three-week lag between
the two publications indicates that there were strong connections and “af-
ﬁnities” between the two denominations ðthey merged in 1957Þ but also
that leaders of the Reformed Church in America had ample opportunity to
be made aware that Christian church leaders’ views were much more
extreme than theirs.
It is perhaps no surprise then that the Reformed Church Messenger also
published the most blunt critique of racism among its fellow social gos-
pelers in two separate articles. The ﬁrst article criticized social gospelers
who were trying to bring about the “kingdom of God” via “racial preju-
dice” and discrimination: “Let us take Christ and His gospel of love seri-
ously. Racial prejudice, unfair discrimination, hatred and economic op-
pression, will not bring about the kingdom of God either in America or
33Although, of course, the fact that it reprinted this article could certainly be taken as an
indication that the RCUS was in favor of eugenics, which we initially concluded, the
overall tone of the journal makes this unlikely and suggests that it reprinted it not
because of the article’s argument that “subnormals” should be sterilized but because of
this article’s argument that “these are the children who may go either up or down ac-
cording to environment and training. A recent estimate was made that eighty per cent of
juvenile delinquents are in this class. Herein is our hope” ðDeer 1924, p. 10Þ.
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anywhere else: these always produced hell on earth. . . . The immigrant
problem involves not merely transformation of the immigrant, but also,
and I would say chieﬂy, the transformation of the American” ðSpinka 1925,
pp. 7–8; emphasis in originalÞ. Six years later, in 1931, as the denomination
watched its fellow social gospelers liberalize on birth control, the Mes-
senger reﬂected sardonically about the growth of eugenicist reasoning
among religious leaders:
As Christians, we certainly rejoice that so much more attention is being paid
today than in past centuries to methods of reclaiming and restoring the less
fortunate children—who are underprivileged, defective and delinquent. It is
both pathetic and tragic, however, that so much more attention is paid to
physical or mental defects than to moral and spiritual shortcomings, and that
so much has to be spent to pay the costs of crime because so little was spent in
promoting the gospel of prevention and in sowing the good seed of truth in the
hearts and minds of youth, both by precept and example. ð1931, p. 4Þ
Harsh as it was, such criticism was relatively rare. And when it came to
the contentious issue of birth control, these denominations remained silent.
These religious groups were cognizant that birth control was a contentious
issue in the country in general and within the religious ﬁeld in particular.
Deep believers in the social gospel movement but all too aware of the
eugenic reasoning behind early liberalizers’ stances, these denominations
decided that the best thing to do regarding birth control was to say noth-
ing at all.
CONCLUSION
In his weekly column “Eugenics and the Church” for the AES periodical
Eugenics, the Reverend Kenneth MacArthur, chair of the Committee for
Cooperation with Clergymen, wrote, “The social ideal of the Kingdom of
God on earth has been rediscovered by church leaders who are emphasiz-
ing an ideal humanity, a just and friendly world, a redeemed mankind. . . .
Eugenics offers a way, consistent with Christian principles, of freeing the
race in a few generations of a large proportion of the feeble-minded, the
criminal, the licentious, by seeing to it . . . that persons carrying these anti-
social traits shall leave behind them no tainted offspring” ð1928, p. 6Þ.
It is clear from this quote that MacArthur was hoping to convince so-
cial gospelers, perhaps because he was aware that some remained un-
convinced, of the importance and righteousness of eugenics. He wanted to
do so because he, like AES leaders in general, saw religious leaders as key
to its education campaigns. As the announcement for its ﬁrst competition
for the best sermon on eugenics stated, religious leaders were essential to
the AES plan to get its message to the “good people” of the “intelligent
classes”:
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Prizes of $500 for the best, $300 for the second, and $200 for the third best
sermon are the rewards. Since the churches are in a measure a natural selective
agency and since a large percentage of the intelligent classes are church mem-
bers, it is hoped that the message of eugenics will be received by thousands of
people in the United States who otherwise would not hear it. The award should
stimulate ministers to a deeper study of this subject, which has such an im-
portant bearing on the welfare of America. It has been said that good people
make the churches and that the churches seldommake the people good. Even if
this is so, the American Eugenics Society hopes that this award will be a help
toward the increase of good people in America ðEugenical News 1926, p. 48Þ.
Who were the “good people” the AES sought to increase via its outreach
to religious leaders? They were educated. They were “white,” or at least
“Anglo-Saxon,” as the terms were understood then. And they were also,
without a doubt, Protestant. That these qualities intersected, and inter-
sected in crucial ways, is clear in terms of who supported the AES—Anglo-
Saxon Protestants ðand Reform JewsÞ—and even clearer in terms of which
of these groups ultimately supported birth control reform—the wealthiest,
most urban, and most highly educated.
These ﬁndings have implications for our understandings about how
religion intersects with other key structures in our society, especially race,
class, and gender.
Perhaps the most obvious, and important, implication of these ﬁndings
is that the ﬁrst issue connected to sex and gender that really divided the
American religious ﬁeld was not a result of divisions regarding women’s
rights or feminism. Religious groups began to promote legalizing birth con-
trol not because they were interested in promoting women’s rights but be-
cause they became convinced that making birth control legal was essential
for the future of their race—critical to maintaining their political and eco-
nomic advantage as racialization theories argue.
That all of this was a racial project on the part of certain elites in a
certain part of the country is driven home by how European immigrants
were seen in the North versus the South and further emphasized by the
contradictions apparent within the broader racial views of both groups.
Many of the early liberalizers were progressive, even activist, in their
stances on “the Negro,” but utterly racist in their attitudes toward im-
migrants. Thus, the Protestant Episcopal Church heralded the Immigra-
tion Restriction Act for preventing “the further dilution of our stock, which
has unquestionably been in serious danger” ðWoodruff 1924, p. 468Þ, but
argued that Negroes are not an inferior race ðCrosby 1932, pp. 567–68Þ.
Similarly, Congregationalists reported optimistically about eliminating the
“very dangerous social malady” of racial prejudice ðHinman 1929, p. 267Þ
and questioned data that demonstrated that “the Negro was of inferior
mental and physical stock” ðClinchy 1930, pp. 170–71Þ while advocating
eugenics ðBishop 1929Þ.
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Such contradictions did not exist for southern eugenicists whose focus
was on blacks whose political or numerical threat was brutally repressed
by a set of well-established institutions of racial domination. They saw
Catholic immigrants as a racial boon or missionary opportunity, if they
mentioned them at all.
If, as we have shown, early religious divisions about sex and gender were
really about race and class, what does this mean for today? We think that
it suggests that while the culture wars appear to be about the politics of
sex and gender, they are also about race and class. Although it well known
that mainline Protestants and Jews tend to support gay rights, abortion,
and women’s rights, that black Protestants and Catholics are more varied
in their support from issue to issue, and that evangelicals tend to be the most
conservative overall ðSteensland et al. 2000; Bolzendahl and Brooks
2005Þ, there has been little examination of how intersections of race and
class might have led, or continue to contribute, to this outcome. This study
is a call for more.
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